The U.S. has been under pressure to abandon the unique first-to-invent feature of its patent law for awarding patents. The opposition to reform argues that switching to a first-to-file rule, the international norm, will undermine innovation. We evaluate this argument in a dynamic stochastic model of a patent race, and find partial support. Also, under the first-to-invent the inventor never has to file for a patent unless he must sue, but there is much filing activity in the U.S. despite the filing fees. This puzzle is also investigated.
Introduction
Despite recent successes in harmonizing patent law internationally, the U.S. patent law still retains some unique features. In this paper we focus on one such feature, namely, the firstto-invent rule.
1 When two people apply for a patent on the same invention, the person who filed his application first gets the patent virtually everywhere else in the world. 2 In the U.S., however, determination is made as to priority of invention, and a patent is awarded to the person who can demonstrate to have discovered the invention first. Although the U.S. has repeatedly expressed its willingness to conform to a first-to-file rule, the international norm, the opposition to reform remains strong.
3
The opposition in the U.S. embraces two arguments. One is that the first-to-invent rule protects small inventors who may take longer time to prepare patent applications and who therefore would in a first-to-file system lose to major corporate inventors capable of hiring an army of patent lawyers. 4 However, Lerner (2003) asserts that this argument is spurious since the recent patent law reform in the U.S. has created a new provisional patent application, which is much simpler to file. Further, in the U.S., disputes over priority of invention are settled in a legal proceeding called interference, which involves examining laboratory logbooks, establishing dates for prototypes, and so on at a hearing before the USPTO (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) Board. 5 In one estimate the adjudication of the average interference costs over one hundred thousand dollars (Kingston 1992) . Since the costs of interferences are borne equally by the parties involved, a first-to-invent rule does not necessarily protect financially constrained small inventors. An empirical study by Cohen and Ishii (2005) confirms this point.
The authors find that interference does not help small individual inventors against large corporate inventors. Thus, concludes Lerner (2003) , "the greatest beneficiary from the first-toinvent system is the small subset of the patent bar that specializes in international law."
Thus, we turn to the opposition group's second argument; switching to a first-to-file rule will undermine innovation because a patent issues not to the inventor but to the individual who is fastest in filing a patent application. Although the precise mechanism by which first-tofile undermines innovation is never spelled, the opposition often bolsters its argument by adducing the undeniable fact that the U.S. has led the world in inventions for more than a century, and attributing that remarkable record to the first-to-invent feature of the patent law that the nation has had since 1836. 6 The main objective of the present paper is to evaluate the opposition's argument that a first-to-file rule undermines innovation relative to a first-to-invent rule. In doing so, we focus on two types of risks faced by an inventor. One is the risk of losing his invention to someone who discovers it later. First-to-invent diminishes this risk, giving an inventor time and security to experiment with and perfect his invention without the fear of losing it to later inventors. On the other hand, however, first-to-invent exposes the inventor to the risk of duplication. Since the 5 See Cohen and Ishii (2005) for a detailed study of the interference process. 6 For example, one writes "It should be understood that it is because the U.S. has a first to invent structure and the rest of the world has a first to file structure that the U.S. is the production and employment machine that it is." (See http//www.piausa.org/layout/set/print/patent_reform_issue.)
inventor can establish his priority of invention at any time under the first-to-invent rule, he can delay filing for a patent. In such an environment, the inventor in general bears the risk of reinventing something that has already been discovered, wasting time and resources and being sued in the end. Due to these two conflicting risks, it is not a priori clear whether first-to-invent is more conducive to invention than first-to-file.
In addition, the first-to-invent also poses a puzzle. Given that, in reality, filing for a patent is costly in terms of legal fees and the time to write the patent application, it is not clear why inventors should file for a patent at all in first-to-invent unless they must sue. And yet we see so much filing activity in the U.S., even though only a small fraction of patentees end up suing for patent infringements.
In this paper we examine these issues in a dynamic model of a patent race. The model has two stages. In the first stage, each firm chooses a level of investment in R&D, which determines its probability of discovery in the second-stage game. This assumption is consistent with the finding of Cohen and Ishii (2005) that most patent races are among major corporate research laboratories chasing well-defined research topics, where initial setups are of utmost importance in conducting research.
The second stage consists of an infinite time horizon. At each instant, the firms simultaneously decide whether to carry out R&D activity at a fixed cost c, representing, e.g., the cost of running the lab. If they proceed with R&D activity, nature chooses a "success" or a "failure" for each firm according to the probability of discovery determined in stage 1. Each firm learns what nature chose for it, but not what nature chose for the rival. Thus, there is an informational asymmetry in the model.
Once having made a discovery (at a stochastic date), a firm decides whether to file for a patent immediately or improve the quality of the invention. The improvement process is not stochastic but time-consuming. For simplicity we assume the process requires a fixed time.
After completing the improvement process, the firm again decides whether to file for a patent or delay until it has to sue (this decision is irrelevant in first-to-file, because there the inventor must establish his priority by filing). A strong novelty requirement or scope protection is assumed, so if there is a patent on the unimproved invention the improved version will not be patented separately.
Our results can now be summarized. The first-to-file rule yields two types of purestrategy equilibria, depending on the parameter values. In one, the firms file immediately, in another, they improve the invention. There is also the mixed-strategy equilibrium between filing and delaying. The first-to-invent rule also yields the same two pure-strategy equilibria, but the one in which the firms improve the invention risk-dominates the one with filing immediately. There is also the equilibrium in which the inventor improves the invention but delays filing unless he must sue, but the existence of this equilibrium is contingent on the cost of interferences being sufficiently low relative to the patent application fee. However, as we saw above, the cost of interferences are substantial in reality. This then can explain the puzzle why there is much filing activity in the U.S.
Our analysis also shows that the firms invest more in R&D when they improve the invention. Since the firms always improve the invention in first-to-invent but not necessarily so in first-to-file, our result suggests that first-to-invent is more conducive than first-to-file when the improvement does not add much to the value of the invention.
The paper contributes to the existing literature that examined various aspects of patent law; for example, patent length and breath (Nordhaus 1969 , Gilbert and Shapiro 1990 , Klemperer 1990 , O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse 1998), novelty requirements (Scotchmer and Green 1990) , patent renewal rules (Scotchmer 1999, Cornelli and Schankerman 1999) , and pre-grant patent publication Prusa 1996, Aoki and Spiegel 2003) . However, there is, to the best of the author's knowledge, no formal analysis of the first-to-invent feature of the U.S. patent law, with the exception of Scotchmer and Green (1990) . Their work however differs significantly from the work on hand both in focus and setup. Scotchmer and Green (1990) consider the setup in which two firms races to improve some base-level technology already patented to a third-party. There are two innovations:
intermediate and final. Two features set their work apart from the present study. First, there, the probability of innovation is exogenous so the relative effect of the two rules on the levels of R&D investment is unexamined. More importantly, in their model there is complete information; the firm learn immediately when the rival discovered the innovation, whether it is patented or not. So, unlike in this paper, firms do not face the risk of duplication.
As regards focus, Scotchmer and Green (1990) Scotchmer and Green (1990) thus conclude that first-to-file accelerates discovery of the final innovation relative to first-to-invent in a broader set of parameter values they consider.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. The next section gives a more detailed description of the model. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the study of first-to-file, and first-to-invent, respectively. In Section 5 we compare the incentives to innovate under these two rules. Section 6 concludes.
Environment
We consider an R&D race between two symmetric firms, i = A, B. The model has two stages. In the first stage each firm simultaneously chooses a level k i of investment in R&D, which determines the probability of discovery to be explained in detail below. The second stage has an infinite time horizon, with time running continuously from t = 0. There, the first-stage R&D investment generates a Poison process, with the cumulative probability of discovery by time t given by
where the hazard rate h i = h(k i ) is determined by the first-stage R&D investment.
The invention generates the flow m of revenues without the improvement and the flow µ with the improvement. The improvement process is non-stochastic and takes a fixed length of time Δ to complete. The premature abandonment of improvement adds nothing to the value of the invention. A patent is issued immediately whenever the inventor files for it with the application fee f > 0. We assume strong novelty or scope requirements in patent law so that the improved invention cannot be patented separately if the original invention has been patented, and vice versa.
Finally, not to make the model trivial, assume that
where r is the instantaneous rate of interest. The left-hand side of the inequality denotes the net value of the improved invention. Thus, the above inequality says that the invention is worth improving in the absence of rivalry. However, that need not be the case under rivalry.
In contrast to Scotchmer and Green (1990) this paper assumes incomplete information.
Nature reveals the outcomes of R&D activities to each firm but not to its rival. Thus, unless the inventor files for a patent, the rival, if he has not discovered the invention yet, does not know that there has been a discovery. 7 Since the firms play a game of incomplete information, we look for a perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, according to which the equilibrium strategies are sequentially rational, given beliefs, while beliefs are Bayes-consistent with the strategies on the equilibrium path. In solving the models we focus on a stationary equilibrium of the game, i.e., a strategy that specifies a time-independent action for all t ≥ 0.
First-to-file
Under the first-to-file rule, because priority of invention must be established by filing for a patent, never filing (unless the inventor must sue) is never an equilibrium outcome. Thus, we consider two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria: one in which both firms file for a patent immediately, and one in which both improve the invention. We begin with the former.
3.A. Equilibrium in which firms file immediately for a patent
In perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the firms form beliefs as to the probability that the rival has made the discovery to date. The equilibrium under consideration implies the following beliefs: when a patent has not been issued to the rival before t, the firm believes that the rival has not discovered the invention yet. Using such beliefs, we proceed to describe the equilibrium profit. Given the Poison process, R&D activity by firm A results in a discovery with the probability (1 -e − h a ε ) during a brief time interval [t, t + ε), where ε > 0 is arbitrarily short, and the hazard rate h a is pre-determined. It can be showed that the expected profit to firm A approaches h a (m/r -f) -c when ε approaches zero. This profit of course is conditional on the invention not having yet discovered before t. Given the independent Poison processes, neither firm has discovered the invention before time t with the joint probability that exp[-(h a + h b )t].
Summing these conditional expected profits over time t ≥ 0, we obtain the total expected profit for the second-stage game as
Turning to the first stage, the exposition simplifies considerably if we let the firms directly choose the hazard rate h i instead of the R&D investments k i . We thus evaluate the above integral, and subtracting the cost of R&D investment to arrive at the expected net profit to A:
where k(h i ) denotes the cost of investment in R&D. In the first stage, firm A chooses h a to maximize (1), given h b . The first term in (1) is concave in h a . To ensure an interior optimum, assume that k(h i ) satisfies the Inadan conditions: i.e., k(0
where primes denote differentiation.
The first-order condition can be arranged to yield the following equation:
This implicitly defines A's best response function r 0 (h b ), where subscript "0" reminds us that the firms file for a patent without no (zero) improvement on the invention. Firm B solves the symmetric problem. The symmetric Nash equilibrium levels of investment (probabilities)
obtain by putting h a = h b in (2). We denote this common equilibrium value by h 0 *.
In the equilibrium no firms should have the unilateral incentive to deviate from the equilibrium behavior. Thus, consider if firm A, having discovered the invention in period t, has any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium behavior of filing immediately for a patent. If A chooses to improve the invention instead, the net profit would be exp(-rΔ)(µ/r -f) in the absence of rivalry, but with the rivalry with B, that profit is conditional on B not discovering the invention while A improves the invention. If B makes a discovery before A completes the improvement, B files immediately for a patent. Given that B fails to discover the invention during the interval Δ with the probability exp(-h b Δ), the expected profit to A of a deviation equals
Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate if and only if
where we replaced h b with the equilibrium hazard rate, h 0 *.
Although the invention is worth improving, in first-to-file the inventor faces the risk of losing the invention to the rival who discovers the invention later but files first. Thus, if the probability of discovery during the improvement process is large, or exp(-h 0 *Δ) is small, then the firms prefer to file immediately.
3.B. Equilibrium in which the invention is improved
We next consider the equilibrium in which each firm improves the invention. In this case, at time t ≥ Δ, the firm does not know for sure whether the rival has discovered the invention during the preceding interval [t -Δ, t). However, the rival would have filed for a patent before t if he made a discovery before t -Δ. Thus, the firm knows whether the rival did or did not discover the invention before t -Δ.
While A thus has imperfect information over the interval [t -Δ., t), it believes that with the probability [1 -exp(-h b Δ)] B has made a discovery and is improving the invention. In this case, B will surely file for a patent before A completes its improvement process. Therefore, A earns the revenue only if B did not make the discovery during the preceding interval, which has the likelihood of exp(-h b Δ). Thus, A's net profit from doing R&D at t ≥ Δ is
This of course is conditional on A not having made a discovery before t and B not having done the same before t -Δ ≥ 0, which occurs with the joint exp(-h a t)exp[-h b (t -Δ)]. Weighting the profit (3) with these probabilities and summing over t ≥ Δ, we obtain
For t < Δ, the situation is similar except that firm A is ignorant about the rival's discovery of the lack thereof over the shorter interval [0, t) < Δ, during which B makes the discovery with the probability 1 -exp(-h b t). Thus, the corresponding sum of the expected profit to firm A over this interval is given by
Adding up (4) and (5) and subtracting the cost of investment in R&D yields the total net profit for A:
The first-order condition for the maximum of (6) yields
The symmetric Nash equilibrium obtains by setting h a = h b in (7) and is denoted by h 1 *.
We next check the inventor's incentive to deviate. Suppose that A, having discovered the invention at t, files for a patent immediately instead of improving the technology as required for the equilibrium. Then, being the first to file, A gets the patent and the payoff of m/r -f, whether or not B has already discovered the invention. This profit should be contrasted to the the comparable equilibrium profits, which are either
It follows that A has no incentive to deviate at any t ≥ 0, if
We have obtained the following result.
Proposition 1: In first-to-file:
(A) The model possesses the equilibrium in which both firms choose to file immediately for a patent on the original invention, if the equilibrium probability h 0 * satisfies
(B) The model possesses the equilibrium in which both firms choose to improve the quality of the invention if the equilibrium probability h 1 * satisfies
Finally, it is straightforward to check that there is no asymmetric equilibrium in first-tofile as the firm has no incentive to postpone filing if the rival files immediately for a patent. Also, the model does not possess the equilibrium in which the firms never file for a patent, for in first-to-file filing is necessary for establishment of priority of invention.
3.C. A comparison of the two equilibrium R&D efforts
We now compare the levels of investment in R&D in the two equilibrium outcomes above. Since the proof of the next result is just simple algebra without useful insight, we relegate it to the appendix and report only the conclusion here.
Proposition 2: h 1 * > h 0 *; that is, in first-to-file firms invest more in R&D when they improve the invention than when they file immediately for a patent.
Since the improved invention is more valuable, this conclusion seems obvious, but not so given the fact that the inventor takes the risk of duplication and hence incurs higher R&D costs (N > 1 in Equation (8)).
The next question we examine is what determines which equilibrium to occur. Note that h 0 * < h 1 * implies exp(-h 0 *Δ) > exp(-h 1 *Δ). Thus, if
the firms file for a patent right away, while if
the firms improve the invention, as we stated in Proposition 1. However, Propositions 1 and 2
give rise to the case in which
If (10) holds, the both conditions in Proposition 1 fail, implying there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, as we show in the appendix, there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies;
i.e., the firms randomize between filing immediately and improving the invention. In this mixed strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium expected profit equals m/r -f. Thus, in the mixedstrategy equilibrium the firms invest h 0 * in R&D. The next proposition summarizes the findings of this section.
Proposition 3: In first-to-file, the firms invest h 1 * in R&D if
and h 0 * (< h 1 *) if the inequality above is reversed.
First-to-invent
We turn next to the first-to-invent rule, one of the main features of the American patent law. In first-to-invent, when both firms apply for a patent, priority is determined through interferences as explained in the introduction. As noted there, both firms equally share the cost of an interferences hearing, which are fairly substantial. We let I denote the cost of the interference per firm. For the next two subsections we assume that the inventor files for a patent after the improvement process. The assumption is relaxed in the subsequent subsection.
4.A. Equilibrium in which firms file immediately for a patent
The equilibrium outcome is the same that we obtained and discussed for first-to-file.
Here, we need only to check the incentive to deviate under the first-to-invent rule. Thus, suppose that, having discovered the invention in period t, A deviates, choosing to improve the invention instead of filing immediately. Then, with the probability [1 -exp(-h b Δ)], B will make a discovery and file for a patent before A does. While this reduces the profit to A to zero in firstto-file, in first-to-invent A can establish its priority before an interference hearing at the additional cost of I. This suggests that a deviation yields:
That is, in first-to-invent firm A's priority is secure, now matter what, but the cost of the interference must be borne when firm B files for a patent before A completes the improvement.
Now the no-deviation condition can be stated as:
or in this equivalent form:
A comparison of this condition with that in (9) indicates that, if µ/r -f > I, or the cost of the interference hearing is less than the value of the improved innovation, valued at the time of filing, then the right-hand side of (12) exceeds that of (9), meaning that the firms file immediately for a patent in first-to-invent for a narrower ranges of parameters than they do in first-to-file.
4.B. Equilibrium in which the invention is improved
The equilibrium outcome is the same that we obtained in Subsection 3.B under the first-to-file rule. The difference between the two rules manifests itself in the inventor's incentive to deviate. Again let firm A deviate, having discovered the invention at t. Filing immediately for a patent, A would obtain m/r -f only if B did not discover the invention during the preceding interval [t -Δ, t) for t ≥ Δ. If B has made the discovery before A, B will get the patent, and A the cost of an interference hearing. Thus, a deviation yields
Subtracting this from the equilibrium profit, we obtain the following no-deviation condition
Since this inequality always holds, improving the invention is the equilibrium in first-to-invent for all the relevant parameter values.
To sum the discussion of this section so far, if (11) fails, improving the invention is the only equilibrium outcome. In contrast, if (11) holds, filing immediately for a patent is also the equilibrium outcome. However, we show, in the appendix, that this equilibrium is riskdominated by the equilibrium in which they improve the invention. Thus, we conclude Proposition 4: In first-to-invent, firms always improve the invention.
C. Equilibrium in which firms never file for a patent
We have so far assumed that an inventor always patents his/her invention. It is easily seen that filing for a patent is the equilibrium behavior in first-to-file, for the inventor must file to claim priority. However, in first-to-invent the first inventor never has to file for a patent unless he must sue. Given that there is the filing cost, then, it is not all too clear why there is so much filing activity in the U.S. In the remainder of this section we examine this puzzle.
For this purpose we need the additional assumption as follows. If the two firms have the inventions simultaneously, the flow profits each derives are less than when one inventor possesses the invention. A decrease in profit alerts the first inventor when the rival discovers the invention, even if neither has patented the invention, so that the former can call for an interference hearing to establish his priority. Thus, without this assumption the relationship between the firms ceases to be rivalrous.
With this additional assumption, consider the equilibrium in which an inventor never files for a patent unless to sue for patent infringement. As before, we first describe the equilibrium and then check the incentive to deviate. In the equilibrium, firm A improves the invention but does not file for a patent until firm B files for a patent.
If B has not discovered the invention yet, upon completing the improvement process, A receives the revenue µ until B makes a discovery. When that happens, the falling profits alert a to the discovery by B. A then files for a patent and establish priority at an interference hearing.
This suggests the following profit to A, valued at the time of the completion of the improvement:
As the first inventor, A is assured of the revenue µ/r, but must incur the additional costs (f + I) of filing and the interference whenever B makes a discovery.
We have so far assumed that firm A discovered the invention before B did. Suppose instead that B discovers the invention before A. Then, firm A will be challenged in an interference hearing and will lose, incurring the loss of (f + I). Since B would have discovered the invention before t with the probability 1 -exp(-h b t), we obtain the following expected profit to A:
Using this profit, we can specify the total net profit for the first stage and obtain the Nash equilibrium investment in R&D. Since this now familiar procedure adds no new insight to our understanding, we relegate it to the appendix. Here we simply denote the equilibrium level of investment in R&D by h 2 *. Now, consider a deviation by A, who files for a patent after the improvement at t + Δ. If B has the invention before t, B will respond by calling for an interference hearing, and B will win the case. If B did not have the invention before t, A receives the patent and B drops out of the race. Thus, the expected profit to A from the deviation is
Subtracting this from U, we have the following no-deviation condition for never filing for a
Thus, never filing is the equilibrium outcome if and only if (13) rf > h 2 *I.
Proposition 5: In the first-to-invent rule, the firms improve the invention and file for a patent, if and only if (13) holds in reverse.
Intuitively, since the first-to-invent rule guarantees priority of invention for the first inventor, there seems little need to file for a patent unless the inventor must sue. However, an interference hearing is a very costly choice. The inventor has an alternative option; however.
By filing for a patent the inventor sends a clear signal to the rival that the invention has been discovered, thereby obviating interferences forever. Filing for a patent is a more attractive option if the cost of the interference is more than the application fee, reversing (13). In fact,
given that interferences are extremely costly, we expect that in reality (13) is more likely to hold in reverse. This may explain why there is much filing activity in the U.S. when the inventors never really have to file to establish priority of invention.
A comparison of first-to-file and first-to-invent
We now answer the question whether first-to-invent furthers innovation relative to firstto-file in the next proposition.
Proposition 6:
(A) If in first-to-file the firms file immediately for a patent (with positive probability), first-toinvent induces more efforts in R&D than first-to-file.
(B) Suppose that in first-to-file the firms improve the invention. If (13) is reversed, first-to-file and first-to-invent are equally conducive to R&D.
(C) If (13) holds, first-to-invent again is more conducive to R&D than first-to-file.
The first two parts of the proposition are simply the summary of what we have already established. First, suppose that (13) holds in reverse, so that in first-to-invent the firms file for a patent on competing the improvement. Suppose further that the value of the patent on the improved invention is sufficiently large. Then, the firms invest h 1 * under the first-to-file and first-to-invent rules. On the other hand, if first-to-file induces the inventor to file immediately for a patent, then, h 1 * > h 0 *; the firms invest more in R&D under the first-to-invent rule than under the first-to-file rule.
Part (C) of Proposition 6 compares the levels of investment in R&D when (13) holds. If (13) holds, the inventor finds saving the filing fee worthwhile relative to incurring the cost of interference. However, delaying filing for a patent also exposes the inventor to the increased uncertainty, because he never finds out whether the rival has discovered the invention until he discovers his own. Despite this, we can show in appendix that h 2 * > h 1 *, which is part (C).
Our main findings are based on the following intuition. In our model firms prefer the improved version to the original and would exert more effort in R&D if they could agree to commit to taking time to improve. Although such a commitment is impossible to make, firstto-invent guarantees such a result by eliminating the risk of losing the invention to a latecomer.
In contrast, first-to-file does not provide such guarantee. As we saw, if the improvement results in insufficient value added, however, firms choose to file immediately for a patent in the fear of losing the patent to the late inventors. But the reduced value of invention diminishes the incentive to invest in R&D.
Concluding remarks
Despite considerable pressure from the international community to conform to the international norm, the first-to-invent feature of its patent law draws much support in the U.S.
One supporting argument is that the first-to-invent feature makes the U.S. the innovation powerhouse that it is. In this paper we evaluate this claim in a stochastic model of R&D competition. When there is a discovery, the inventor can file immediately for a patent or take time to improve the invention for an increased value before filing. We find that when this incremental value is substantial the first-to-file and the first-to-invent rule induce the same level of investment in R&D. If the incremental value is less substantial, however, the first-to-invent rule induces more efforts in R&D than the first-to-file rule.
Since the firms never have to file for a patent to establish priority of invention in firstto-invent, why there is much filing activity in the U.S. despite the filing fees is an empirical conundrum. To address this issue, we also consider the case in which firms never files unless they sue the rival. We find that such a result arises in equilibrium when the filing fee is expensive relative to the interference fee. This condition is unlikely to be met in reality so that most firms file for a patent to avoid having to sue the rival. However, if this condition is satisfied, first-to-invent induces strictly greater efforts in R&D than first-to-file.
Our results are derived under some simplifying assumptions. One is the assumption that the operating cost is constant at c. Should it increase with investment in R&D, maybe because a larger lab requires more maintenance cost, then that would make investment in R&D less attractive. However, it would be unlikely to reverse our finding because one can invest just as much in first-to-invent as in first-to-file and still get greater profit due to the improvement.
On the other hand, should the operating costs fall with R&D investment, perhaps because the greater investment in R&D the more efficient the lab is to operate daily, then our case is likely to be strengthened.
In this paper we focus on individual firms' incentive to invest in R&D for some welldefined R&D target under the two rules, where strategic interactions are important. In the real world, innovations can give rise to innovation cycles or subsequent innovations, some of which may be inconceivable before the original innovations are discovered (see, e.g., Scotchmer, 1995, and O'Donoghue 1998 , on some issues). In this case, the issue is less on the strategic interaction of the rival firms but on how fast the original invention spawns successive inventions in society. It is important that the two rules be compared in such a context. It is also a worthwhile exercise to construct a growth model to examine the effect of the two rules on the growth rate. Finally, while we compare the two rules as two alternatives in one country, it would be useful to investigate the effect of patent law harmonization in a model of two countries, letting one country switch from the first-to-invent rule to the first-to-file rule, which is already in use in the other countries. We leave these exercises for future research.
